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1         Abstract
 
The bulk of  the  global  innovative effort  takes  place  in  5 countries:  USA, Japan and China  as 
leaders, with France and United Kingdom as immediate followers, which all display, on the long 
run,  a  negative marginal  value added on innovation.  The present  paper  attempts to  answer the 
following question: why does most of innovative activity takes place in markets apparently hostile  
to innovation, i.e. giving back negative marginal value added on innovation ? A model is introduced 
in which any market may be represented as a Selten’s extensive game, subgames of which are 
played as Harsanyi’s games with imperfect information, by a temporarily finite and changing set of 
players.  The firms’ innovative activity is  a  Nash’s  dynamic equilibrium in which innovating is  
rational  though  suboptimal,  without  premium on innovation  being  a  real  economic  profit.  The 
model is the theoretical framework for the study of six cases: Ford Motor, General Motors, Honda, 
Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM, which allow to conclude that firms do innovation either because 
they have to or because this is their comparative advantage and they can do it in an exceptionally 
efficient way. As economic growth is grounded in efficient business patterns and in some countries 
those  business  patterns  shape  themselves  in  the  context  of  a  strong  exogenous  pressure  on 
innovation. This leads to the development of economies which, regardless its pace of economic 
growth and balance of payments, come to a point when marginal value added on innovation is 
negative. At this point, however, incentives to innovate do not disappear and firms continue to apply 
the same business patterns and thus do create scientific input which gives back negative marginal 
real output. This pattern of global technological progress seem to be quite durable, with financial 
markets that allow to compensate,  by successful financial placements, the downturns of innovative 
projects.  
 
  
2         Introduction
 
The present economic crisis, as all crises, gives way to questions about the future economic order 
and  the  prospects  for  global  economic  growth.  One  of  the  questions  concerns  technological 
progress. The declarations of Barack Obama about the new gear for the American economy coming 
from  new  technologies  bring  forth  two  main  questions:  a)  what  is  the  pace,  intensity  and 
geographical pattern of technological progress in the global economy, both from the input and the 
output  point  of  view ?  b)  what  are  the  patterns  of  behaviour  of  business  firms,  the  necessary 
transformers  of  scientific  invention  into  economic  growth,  vis  a  vis  scientific  progress  and 
technological change ? 
The present paper attempts to answer those questions on the grounds of available information on 
patentable innovation and aggregate accounts in thirteen countries – Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  UK, USA, India,  China and Brasil  –  as  well  as 
information about innovative effort and financial performance of 6 global corporations: Ford Motor, 
General Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM.
3         The macroeconomic context
3.1       Scientific input to real economy
 
Technological progress consists both in creating scientific inventions and in using them as input for 
creation of wealth in the real economy. Therefore the first important issue is how to measure the  
scientific input. Ideas and discoveries are not exactly countable, as both their appearance and effects 
are  difficult  to  define  precisely.  On the  other  hand the  number  of  patent  applications  filled  is  
frequently used as the aggregate measure of the number of scientific inventions bearing important 
economic consequences ( see for example: Jaffe et al. 1982; Frantzen 2000; Holmen, Jacobsson 
1998; Eaton, Kortum 1999; Rensman, Kuper 1999). Of course, many inventions are not patentable 
or  it  is  not  profitable  to  patent  them, For  example in  oil  & gas  drilling business,  where most  
innovations are so strongly site – specific that the probability of imitation is negligible but, on the 
other hand, the fact of publishing the description of those innovations could bring, for a firm, the 
risk of uncovering too many cards to the competitors. In the same way there are strong differences 
among countries as for the quality of their local intellectual property protection regimes. Scientific 
input appears at different peers of the value chain of the economy, however on the long run most 
scientific input to industry ends up as modifications or creation of final goods in the consumer 
markets. In these markets global marketing success strongly depends on patenting. On the other 
hand patenting is essential to global technology diffusion and spillover. At first sight patents seem to 
be a barrier to technology spillover as it assumes legal protection of inventions. However, on the 
long  run  patenting  plays  the  same  role  as  any  legally  regulated  procedure  –  it  is  a  way  of 
communicating and solving complex problems in broad social  systems. As a matter of fact,  an 
invention is more likely to spillover when patented – all the actors of the process are in a clear 
situation then,  with equally clear  transaction  costs  and opportunities  for  economic rent.  Non – 
patented inventions, on the contrary, are much harder to diffuse as there is very few legal ways to do 
it. Thus research and development activity that ends up in a patent procedure can be considered as a 
complete process of technological development, with maximum value added, compared to those 
R&D projects which remain outside the patenting regime. Therefore patentable ( and patented ) 
innovation is essential to economic development and in this paper the number of patent applications 
filled  by  applicants  domestic  to  the  given  country  is  considered  as  the  aggregate  measure  of 
scientific input to the real economy of this country.
Currently the bulk of the global innovative effort, measured with the number of patent applications, 
seems to take place in  5 countries:  USA, Japan and China as leaders,  with France and United 
Kingdom as immediate followers ( see Table 1). Among those five, Japan alone represents about 
one half of the world’s scientific input. Japan and United States account for more than 80% of it.  
Therefore the first fact important for the present study is that the global scientific input is actually 
not  as  global  as it  could seem ( Germany is  not  included in the table  due to  the fact  that  it’s 
unification  in  the  post  communist  period  makes  comparisons  difficult.  At  present  the  German 
economy represents some 60 000 domestic patent applications per year.). Furthermore, among those 
five four are developed countries, with one challenger – China – coming along at pace that has been 
particularly accelerated during the last two decades. Surprisingly enough India and Brasil, usually 
mentioned with China as other dominant emerging markets, come with less than one tenth each of 
the number of domestic patent applications. Among the thirteen countries subject to the present 
analysis only five – Canada, Finland, Japan, USA and China – have significantly increased their 
scientific input whilst other developed countries - Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and United Kingdom – have witnessed an important downsizing of their innovative activity. 
Table 1 - Total number of domestic patent applications filled in selected countries, since 1950 until 2007. 
Total number of domestic patent applications filled
1950 - 1970 1971 - 1990 1991 - 2007
Canada           30 588              41 974              64 292    
Denmark           20 081              19 172              25 531    
Finland           14 601              29 488              36 785    
France         248 019            243 486            227 930    
Japan         986 175         3 962 044         5 968 371    
Netherlands           51 372              40 247              36 333    
Norway           23 729              16 626              19 607    
Sweden           89 221              80 484              59 250    
UK         447 909            413 901            327 197    
USA      1 335 210         1 336 832         2 597 648    
India           16 018              22 712              43 100    
China           16 000*              81 007            690 965    
Brasil           24 789              46 840              51 428    
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization ( WWW.wipo.org ); * For the period 1950 – 1970 the data for China is author’s own 
estimate. WIPO does not provide the corresponding information
 
The size of the scientific input to economy is significantly influenced by the ability of the labour 
force to produce innovation. Some authors tend to state that the overall equilibrium between the 
research and development activity and real production is determined by the percentage of the labour 
force able to produce innovation (Eaton, Kortum 1999).  The volume of scientific input is one thing, 
the relative ability to do so is another. If we consider the average annual number of domestic patent 
applications per 1000 people employed (Table 2 ),  a significant disparity among the developed 
countries appears, similar to that occurring for the size of scientific input. The size of scientific 
input to real economy in the given country seems to depend strongly upon the relative division of 
labour between the R&D sector on one hand and the sector of production on the other hand, just as 
stated by the “golden rule of research” by Edmund S. Phelps ( 1964). There, two different paths of 
economic development  seem to appear.  The first  one,  represented by Finland,  Japan, USA and 
China, may be called “R&D oriented”. On the long run these countries display a constant growth 
both of scientific input and of the relative propensity of the workforce to perform it. Others, like  
United Kingdom, France, Sweden, India or Brasil, are definitely not oriented in that way. Their 
scientific input and the relative ability of the workforce to innovate are declining or staying quite 
even over the last six decades. 
    
Table 2 - Average number of domestic patent applications per 1000 people employed. 
Average number of domestic patent applications per 1000 people 
employed
1950 - 1970 1971 - 1990 1991 – 2007
Canada           0,2565              0,1952              0,2562    
Denmark           0,4291              0,3746              0,5515    
Finland           0,3093              0,6186              0,9662    
France           0,5852              0,5546              0,5614    
Japan           0,8886              3,3179              5,3747    
Netherlands           0,5278              0,3424              0,2756    
Norway           0,7913              0,4355              0,5128    
Sweden           1,1478              0,9616              0,8206    
UK           0,8498              0,8307              0,7159    
USA           0,9092              0,6643              1,1219    
India           0,0051              0,0048              0,0066    
China           0,0020              0,0081              0,0549    
Brasil           0,0367              0,0456              0,0378    
source: author’s, on the grounds of data from World Intellectual Property Organization ( WWW.wipo.org ) and from The Conference Board 
and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, January 2010 (http://www.conference-
board.org/economics/database.cfm )
 
3.2       The real output from the scientific input
 
At the macroeconomic level innovation is supposed to bring two basic kinds of real returns: a)  
higher productivity b) higher product. The first kind relies on the assumption that scientific input 
leads to more efficient technologies and those, in turn, bring a more efficient usage of labour ( see 
for example: Romer 1986;  Grossman, Helpman 1993).  The second relates the fact that successful 
innovation leads to creation of new product markets ( Schumpeter 1976) and to investment in new 
plant and equipment ( Phelps 1964; Tobin 1961, 1969, 1971), and, consequently to a greater output 
from the given outlays of production factors, as well  as to a greater value added by the whole  
economy. The Table 3 shows average labour productivity, per hour worked, for 11 out of the set of 
13 countries that were taken into account for the computation of scientific input: Canada, Denmark,  
Finland,  France,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  UK,  USA,  India,  China,  Brasil  .  In  all 
eleven countries productivity displays a steady growth on the long run, whilst, as it was previously 
pointed out,  the productivity of the same economies in terms of scientific input tends rather to 
lower, with rare exceptions.  
Table 3 - Average labour productivity per hour worked in 2009 US$
Average labour productivity per hour worked in 2009 US$
1950 - 1970 1971 - 1990 1991 - 2007
Canada $23,86 $33,68 $42,78
Denmark $17,80 $31,11 $45,37
Finland $11,53 $23,40 $39,95
France $14,32 $31,45 $48,99
Japan $8,23 $20,49 $34,28
Netherland
s
$17,58 $37,14 $52,58
Norway $20,04 $41,15 $69,23
Sweden $20,57 $32,67 $43,23
UK $14,45 $24,69 $40,88
USA $23,54 $35,33 $47,18
India n.a n.a. n.a.
China n.a n.a. n.a.
Brasil $4,46 $8,43 $10,12
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, January 2010, http://www.conference-
board.org/economics/database.cfm 
 
The value added by the national economy as a result of the scientific input can be estimated, on the 
long run, as average real GDP per domestic patent application, which is computed in the Table 4, 
for the same set of 13 countries that previously. The rationale behind this average is twofold. Firstly, 
every patentable innovation has to end up as some product or technology and, consequently,  as 
consumption,  investment,  government  spending  or  exports.  Secondly,  patentable  innovation 
contributes  to  move  outwards  the  technological  frontier  of  the  national  economy and  thus  to 
maximize, temporarily, its aggregate value added. The ratio has to be applied to long periods of 
time, as the full transformation of scientific input into real output takes several years. Therefore, on 
the long run the ratio of GDP per domestic patent application is the average value added per unit of 
scientific input and represents the most broadly seen economic output from scientific input. As for 
the 13 countries in question, the average differs significantly among them, the differences tend to 
widen  in  time  and  they  are  not  easily  explainable  by  previously  mentioned  factors:  labour 
productivity, R&D productivity or the size of scientific input. Moreover, they are hardly possible to 
explain by other macroeconomic variables, as GDP per capita or the pace of its growth. The average 
is computed for three different periods of time which allows marginal analysis. Over the whole span 
of observation – from 1950 to 2007 -   marginal GDP per patent application is positive, excepted 
Japan, which had lost 20% of its initial economic profits from patentable innovation. In the same 
interval of time the champions of marginal value added on innovation are,  respectively:  Brasil, 
Netherlands,  Norway and Sweden,  which  all  had  increased  the  value  added  in  question  about 
fourfold. If two consecutive marginal values are computed, the first one for 1971 – 1990 in relation 
to 1950 – 1970 and the second one for 1991 – 2007 in relation to  1971 – 1990, a different picture 
appears drawn. Whilst the first marginal is positive for almost all countries ( excepted Japan, as 
usual), the second one is negative for: Canada, Denmark, Japan, USA and China. Marginal values 
for the period of 1991 – 2007 seem to be inversely proportional to the volume of scientific input. 
Countries displaying the highest scientific input tend to witness a decreasing ability to produce real 
output from it. Of course, it could be stated that there are secondary gains from innovation, resulting 
from its diffusion across global markets. An invention made and patented in United States can bring 
payoffs through its commercialisation in foreign markets  (see for example: Eaton, Kortum 1999). If 
such was the case, countries with negative marginal GDP per patent application should be those 
with a significantly positive balance of payments. This is not the rule at all. Then secondary effects 
of such a positive balance of payments should be captured, on the long run, in the pace of economic 
growth, and, consequently, in a positive marginal GDP per patent application. Therefore, diffusion 
of innovation does not explain why, on the long run, the bulk of the world’s innovative effort takes 
place in markets which, at least at first sight, have been giving a negative return on innovation. 
Table 4 - Average GDP per  domestic patent application ( USD PPP, 2007).
Average GDP per domestic patent application ( USD PPP, 2007)
1950 - 1970 1971 - 1990 1991 - 2007
Canada $175 640 776,04 $290 160 451,59 $275 040 004,98
Denmark $66 101 104,84 $123 520 847,15 $115 773 750,36
Finland $58 750 614,87 $63 919 180,53 $66 875 987,02
France $46 111 772,14 $98 505 039,74 $130 038 794,23
Japan $13 501 330,56 $12 932 500,34 $10 839 609,89
Netherland
s
$64 228 212,60 $164 162 113,53 $247 016 417,26
Norway $46 808 555,59 $135 478 887,23 $172 287 689,90
Sweden $23 881 867,05 $47 635 609,13 $79 490 074,34
UK $32 235 796,11 $54 454 519,05 $89 482 609,00
USA $49 522 463,74 $95 027 896,56 $75 848 094,95
India $468 617 623,01 $658 695 854,50 $827 356 749,90
China $140 640 040,74 $301 769 448,87 $199 093 604,29
Brasil $117 013 151,70 $417 099 155,52 $499 806 012,23
source: author’s
 
There seem to be a country – specific pattern as for both the production of scientific input to real 
economy and the subsequent real output from it, and, in the same time, in all the thirteen countries  
studied both patenting and further economic usage of scientific inventions relies mainly on the 
business sector ( maybe with a slight exception of France, which has a very strong public research 
sector, though intrinsically linked with big corporations like Dassault or Elf). Therefore it is worth 
studying to what extent and in what ways the differences among countries can be explained by 
microeconomic factors, namely by individual strategies of business firms. In this respect a model is 
introduced further below and comparative case studies are conducted on the grounds of it.
 
4         The microeconomic inquiry
 
4.1       Theoretical background
 
Firms tend to innovate when they earn some kind of innovation premium due to market novelty or 
to the increase of productivity ( Arrow 1962; Barzel 1968; Kamien and Schwartz 1982; Scherer 
1967; Loury 1979). This premium tends to diminish as more and more firms innovate in the same 
markets. Innovation brings, among others, a greater diversity of goods offered to consumers. There 
might exist a contradiction, however, between the optimal diversity of products from the point of 
view of the consumer, on one hand and the same kind of diversity considered from the producer’s 
point of view ( Spence 1976; Dixit – Stiglitz 1977). Some economist point out, right in the lines of 
the Schumpeterian tradition, that innovative activity is essentially a reaction to external pressures 
and an act of absorption of some exogenous scientific input rather than autonomous creation. Both 
reaction and absorption are greatly influenced by the imperative to imitate other market players 
(Katz, Shapiro 1985;  Farrel, Saloner 1985; Abrahamson, Rosenkopf 1990, 1993). From this point 
of view strategies of firms vis a vis innovation may be rational though suboptimal, as imitation 
plays a more and more important role.  Besides, it is possible that once set on its tracks with an 
initial input of capital, the R&D function plays its own games and although internal to business 
organizations becomes autonomous in terms of goals and development paths (Phelps 1964; Barzel 
1968). Besides, any kind of outlays of factors of production have to be considered in the context of 
alternative  cost,  should  the  latter  be  the  simplest  benchmark  in  the  form  of  purely  financial 
investment ( Jensen 1993, 1999). The financial peer is even more justified as firms can enter into 
possession  of  results  of  research  or  even  of  ongoing  research  projects  through  mergers  and 
acquisitions (Sudarsanam 2003).
Three questions arise in the light of macroeconomic data. Firstly,  why does most of innovative 
activity take place in markets apparently hostile to innovation, i.e. giving back negative marginal 
value added on innovation ? Secondly, what characteristics of markets or businesses can lead to 
such  a  negative  macroeconomic  response  to  scientific  input  ?  Thirdly,  what  patterns  of  firms’ 
behaviour can yield an important innovative effort in presence of such hostile environment ? Two 
hypotheses arise about firms’ innovative activity as the conventional “premium – on – innovation” 
explanation is becoming doubtful: a) firms innovate because they have to, under the pressure of 
product markets as well as their broad social environment b) firms innovate simply because they 
can, because the R&D sector, that have been developing for decades, is now quite autonomous and 
generates a constant input of scientific discoveries, impossible to ignore. Both hypotheses sum up to 
a more general one, that firms’ innovative activity is a Nash’s dynamic equilibrium (Nash 1950a; 
Nash 1950b; Nash 1951; Nash 1953) in which innovating is rational though suboptimal, without 
premium on innovation being a real economic profit ( Waśniewski 2009).  
 
4.2       The model
 
Any market may be represented as a Selten’s extensive game (1975), subgames of which are played 
as Harsanyi’s games with imperfect information (1953; 1966; 1967; 1968) , by a temporarily finite  
and changing set of players. In each of those subgames each player (i) applies at the moment  t a 
strategy S(i;t) as shown in Equation 1.
Equation 1
S i ; t =[MAi ; t ; R i ; t ]
 -where  S(i;t) is the strategy applied by the player  i at the moment  t,  MA(i;t) is the set of 
modalities of action and R(i;t) is the set of results. 
Strategies S(i;t) are real Nash’s strategies in the sense that they aim at maximizing a complex set of 
pure,  unicriterial  strategies.  The managers  of  a  firm might  undertake  to  maximize:  a)  scale  of  
activity b) profitability c) short - term accumulation of capital d) long – term value for shareholders  
and by the same means the long – term ability of a firm to accumulate capital. Of course, it  is 
arguable whether short – term accumulation of capital is a result or a means to achieve further 
results. For the purpose of the present model it is assumed that any accumulation of capital, even on 
the short – run, is reflected by investment cash – flow and financial cash – flow. As any cash – flow 
creates opportunities for appropriation of economic rent from the corresponding transactions it is 
further assumed that short – term accumulation of capital belongs to the set of results. Maximisation 
of those unicriterial strategies may be achieved through two basic modalities of action. The first one 
is   investment  in  specific  assets  in  the  form of  technologies,  which,  in  turn  is  the  embodied 
scientific input. The second is investment in non – specific financial assets, ex. in sovereign bonds. 
Therefore the set of results  R(i;t) is a real combination of pure results as shown in Equation 2 and 
the set of modalities of action MA(i;t) is real combination of pure modalities as shown in Equation 
3.
 Equation 2
Ri ; t =AS i ; t  ; PRi ; t  ;SCA i ; t  ; LCA i ; t 
-          where AS(i;t) is the scale of activity of the player i at the moment t, PR(i;t) is their profitability, 
SCA(i;t) is their short – term accumulation of capital and  LCA(i;t) is their long – term ability to 
accumulate capital;
 Equation 3
MAi ; t =tech1i ; t  , tech2i ; t  ,... , techN i ; t  ; fa1 i ; t  , fa2 i ; t  ,... , faN i ; t 
-          where techj(i;t) is the investment j of the player i at the time t in specific technologies and faj(i;t) 
 is the investment  j of the player  i at the time  t in non – specific financial assets; Modalities of 
action are twofold in kind but multiple in practical application: a firm can lead many investment 
projects in the same time in each of the two categories. In fact, most big firms do just so, never 
relying on one project;
Every  individual  strategy S(i;t)  is  in  interaction  with  the  space  of  the  game  in  the  sense  that 
individual strategies of different players mutually shape one another. This, in turn, leads to a certain 
degree of isomorphism among individual strategies.  Modalities of action MA(i;t) are heterogeneous 
among players, however the mechanism of mutual observation and imitation makes some typical 
modalities  M*(x;t) of  action  arise,  where  x  is  a  variable  describing  the  type  of  modality.  The 
techj(i;t) modalities of action are undertaken on the grounds of both exogenous and endogenous 
events. The former are all kinds of internal information of a firm, linked to the development of 
human capital (Scherer 1967), the latter are all kinds of response to the requirements of agents 
external to the firm, that response greatly shaped by imitation of other market players (Davies 1979; 
McCardle 1985). 
More techj(i;t) projects are conducted in a sector, bigger is the probability for the product markets to 
reach a state of nearly optimal Dixit – Stiglitz product diversity ( Spence 1976; Dixit – Stiglitz 
1977), and, consequently, for the set of results  R(i;t) to bring poorer scores on two kinds of results: 
the  scale  of  activity  AS(i;t) and  the  profitability  PR(i;t).  The  optimal  Dixit  –  Stiglitz  product 
diversity is likely to appear mainly in consumer markets for final goods and once there, its effects 
will  transmit  upstream of  the  value  chain  to  markets  of  intermediate  and then  primary goods.  
Therefore, on the aggregate scale, more intense is innovative activity in the business sector, more 
likely is this economy to yield negative marginal value added on innovation.  This may but not 
necessarily has to lead further to poorer capital accumulation, both short – term and long term; if 
investments of faj(i;t) kind bring satisfactory return on capital, they can compensate unsatisfactory 
return on techj(i;t) projects and the business sector can continue on accumulating capital. Moreover, 
both in developed economies and in the quickly developing ones the growth of financial markets 
can yield such a high rate of return on investments of faj(i;t) kind, that accumulation of capital and 
the resulting economic growth are not affected by the negative marginal value added on innovation. 
A common reference level R*(t) may be defined at the moment t for the aggregate results R(i;t) of 
every given player i. R*(t) may be an external benchmark as well as an internal average or quantile. 
All strategies  S(i;t) that bear results  R(i;t) lower than the reference level  R*(t) are inefficient and 
unsatisfactory for players. On the other hand strategies S(i;t) with results R(i;t) > R*(t) are efficient 
and satisfactory. The state of the market at any given moment t may be represented as the state of 
the set MP of market participants. This set is fundamentally divided into two subsets: i) the subset 
{R(i;t) > R*(t)} of those market participants, whose strategies are efficient and bring satisfactory 
results ii) the subset {R(i;t) < R*(t)} of those market participants, whose strategies are inefficient 
and bring unsatisfactory results. Market participants that belong to {R(i;t) > R*(t)} are motivated to 
carry on the current game in the sense of Harsanyi’s theory and they do so, whilst those belonging 
to {R(i;t) < R*(t)}  have interest to change the rules of the game and to pass to another game, and 
they  correspondingly  modify  their  modalities  of  action.  Consequently,  market  participants  that 
belong to the subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} tend to keep their modalities of actions unchanged and those 
modalities tend to shape a relatively stable n – tuple space of the game in the sense of Nash’s theory 
as well  as  tend to  a  Nash’s  dynamic equilibrium. On the other  hand,  market  participants  from 
{R(i;t) < R*(t)} do not participate in forming a dynamic Nash’s equilibrium. The dynamics of the 
market depend on mutual proportions between the two subsets  {R(i;t) < R*(t)} and  {R(i;t)  > 
R*(t)}. If the subset {R(i;t) < R*(t)}  prevails on  {R(i;t) > R*(t)} in terms of number of participants 
or their  relative impact  on the market,  the market  as  a  whole tends  towards  structural  change, 
meaning a Harsanyi’s change of the rules and, consequently, a passage to another Selten’s subgame. 
Contrarily, should the subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} in prevail on  {R(i;t) < R*(t)}, the market tends to 
temporary homeostasis, with temporary Nash’s equilibrium, without significant structural change.
Should a significant number of players be adversely affected,  in the payback on their  techj(i;t) 
projects, by the nearly optimal Dixit – Stiglitz product diversity, the response of the whole market in 
terms of structural change can be twofold. If the growth of financial markets and high yields from 
investments of faj(i;t) kind successfully compensate the poor returns on technological change, the 
market  stays  structurally  stable.  If  satisfactory  returns  on  investments  of  faj(i;t) kind  are  not 
reached, then the players achieving poor results on their  techj(i;t) projects will try to change the 
rules of the game by trying to weaken external pressure on innovation, for example by countering 
legislative changes implementing “green” technologies. 
Now the question arises: what is the keystone of financial payoffs from the techj(i;t) projects ? In 
other  words,  what  makes  innovation  and  investment  in  specific  assets  really  profitable  and 
financially attractive on the long run ? Is it just the pattern of “we do innovation to be good looking 
enough to make profitable financial transactions” or is there something else. Case studies presented 
in the next subchapter attempt to answer these questions.
 
4.3       The case studies
 
The case studies introduced in this paper aim at demonstrating how the model is explanative to the 
link between innovative effort undertaken by business firms, the economic outcome of this effort 
and possible macroeconomic consequences. The core question of the study is the same that the one 
which appears in the light of macroeconomic data: why do most of the worlds innovative effort and 
scientific input takes place in markets which are apparently hostile to innovation, as judged by 
marginal GDP per patent application ? 
Six corporations are in focus: Ford Motor, General Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM. 
The first three belong to the automotive sector, being under an important pressure on innovative 
effort, both from the part of product markets as well as increasingly exigent regulations for natural  
environment protection ( Of course, comparing General Motors and Ford on one hand with Honda 
and others can raise the remark that this is observing the obvious. The two American automotive 
giants are well known for their long lasting financial problems. However, they are big firms and 
there  are  representative,  in  a  way,  for  a  whole  category  of  industrial  businesses,  having  been 
operating for a long time at  the verge of economic soundness, the maintaining of jobs and the 
corresponding  social  and  political  pressure  being  more  important  than  purely  financial 
considerations. The case studies are supposed to introduce complexity and not to strive for universal 
representativeness. Therefore studying GM and Ford in this context is, in author’s opinion, rational 
and informative). Ford Motor, for example, declares in its 10-K annual report for the year 2008 that 
one of the major challenges for the R&D activity of the firm is to comply with the regulatory 
framework  implemented  by  European  Commission,  referring  to  a  single  system  for  register, 
evaluate and authorize the use of chemicals with a production volume above one ton per year. This  
framework, called “REACH” is likely to redirect, according to Ford’s managers, the development 
resources from the market – driven activities to those connected with REACH compliance. In a 
general  manner,  the  innovative  strategy  of  Ford  Motor  focuses  on  two  points:  a)  product 
development b) basic research. Activities like manufacturing engineering are excluded from the 
firm’s innovative strategy. As for product development, the declared priority of Ford is to offer 
consumers more fuel – efficient vehicle choices, including to develop plug-in hybrid vehicles and 
infrastructure. As for General Motors, their top priority declared to the public is the development of 
alternative  propulsion  strategy  with  an  objective  to  be  the  recognized  industry  leader  in  fuel 
efficiency through the development of five specific areas: i) increased fuel efficiency in GM cars 
and trucks ii) development of alternative fuel vehicles, biofuels included iii) expansion of the hybrid 
vehicle offerings iv) plug – in electric vehicle technology v) hydrogen fuel cell technology. The GM 
strategy assumes that  all  innovative effort  is  divided into two different  functional  departments: 
global and local. The global R&D effort involves the non – visible parts of the vehicle, the so –  
called “architecture”, like steering, suspension, brake system, heating, ventilation, air – condition 
and electrical system. The local innovative activity, at the regional level, focuses on components 
which are specific to the given GM brand, as exterior and interior design, tuning according to the 
brand character and final validation to meet local legal requirements. Honda Motor has a slightly 
different approach to innovative processes. First of all, the very foundations of Honda lay in the 
Honda Technical Research Institute established in 1946 by Soichiro Honda. Whilst for its Americal 
competitors the key concept of innovative effort seems to be the compliance with various kinds of 
external  factors,  Honda’s  main  driver  of  innovation  is  endogenous  creativity,  with  subsequent 
studies on practical applications. Research and development activities are conducted principally at 
the independent subsidiaries of the Company. Honda R&D Co., Ltd., is responsible for research and 
development on products, with regional subsidiaries:  Honda R&D Americas,  Inc.  in the United 
States; and Honda R&D Europe (Deutschland) GmbH in Germany. Honda Engineering Co., Ltd., 
handles research and development in the area of production technology, supervising the activities of 
production technologies centres around itself as well as around Honda Engineering North America, 
Inc.  Each of  this  units  leads  local  projects  of  product  development  in  three  areas:  motorcycle, 
automotive,  power products, frequently in joint venture with external partners. Besides research 
oriented on product, Honda conducts fundamental research, the two main strands of which are: a) 
the development of a technological base for ethanol production from soft biomass, including plant 
stalks and leaf matters, such as rice straw b) robotics and ASIMO technology. 
Chevron Corporation is engaged, through a number of subsidiaries, into fully integrated petroleum 
operations, chemicals operations, mining operations, power generation and energy services. One of 
the group’s subsidiaries, Chevron Technology Ventures, focuses on innovation, commercialization 
and integration of emerging technologies within Chevron (CTV). CTV identifies, acquires, tests, 
validates,  and  –  if  appropriate  –  helps  integrate  those  technologies  into  the  company's  core 
businesses.  Alternatively,  technologies  may be  studied  then  "shelved"  for  future  consideration. 
Chevron Technology Ventures works through four business units: 
i)                    Venture Capital, Chevron Technology Ventures Investments (CTVI), which finds 
and  makes  investments  in  early-stage  companies  offering  technology  valuable  to 
Chevron. CTVI then helps Chevron business units implement that technology;
ii)                   Biofuels  -  CTV's  Biofuels  business  unit  is  developing technologies  related  to 
large-scale commercial production and distribution of non-food biofuels in the United 
States; 
iii)                 Hydrogen business unit operates five hydrogen demonstration fueling facilities in 
the United States and manages Chevron's participation in federal and state government 
hydrogen programs. It also monitors developments in hydrogen technology in order to 
maintain and improve the company's capabilities.
iv)                 Emerging Energy - CTV's Emerging Energy business unit is exploring innovative 
ways that Chevron can use renewable energy to run its operations more cost-effectively 
while reducing our carbon footprint.
Another unit of the group, Technology Marketing (TEMA), provides its technologies and services 
to refiners through its two joint venture partnerships - Chevron Lummus Global LLC and Advanced 
Refining  Technologies  LP.  TEMA  also  commercializes  emerging  technologies  and  provides 
international technical service to help refiners. 
Chevron is operating in a vertical market – the oil & gas one - where being in control both of the 
upstream mining  activities  and  of  the  downstream  petrochemical  product  markets  is  the  core 
business pattern. Innovation in the oil & gas sector is strongly site – oriented, with relatively few 
generic, patentable product and technologies and a lot of innovative effort going on as adaptation of  
such generic technologies to particular drilling sites. On the other hand, the downstream Chevron’s 
business is more prone to patenting, with a relatively greater importance of imitable and therefore 
patentable innovations. Akzo Nobel is a chemical company, currently focused mainly on specialty 
chemicals, decorative paints and industrial coatings, though a long presence in the biotechnology 
sector (  Organon Biosciences  )  had been to  notice in the firm’s activity up to 2007. From the 
organizational point of view AkzoNobel runs a dedicated Research,  Development & Innovation 
(RD&I) unit – in which the vast majority of researchers are based in dedicated customer-facing 
business teams, oriented mainly on new products. Some 57% of R&D expenses of AkzoNobel are 
spent  in  Europe,  22%  in  the  Asiatic  market,  21%  in  America.  Between  the  automotive 
manufacturers on one hand and the oil & gas sector on the other, Akzo Nobel’s business seems to be 
medium  –  verticalized,  with  a  significant  role  assigned  to  the  transformation  of  fundamental 
chemical research into commercial solutions. The main fields of research are: a) colloid science b) 
extensional rheology c) materials science.  
IBM is an IT company with an ongoing strategic reorientation from commodity markets to complex 
IT services. Due to this fact the specificity of innovative effort at IBM is that the R&D function 
strictly  considered  is  hard  to  distinguish,  in  practice,  from  immediate  business  application. 
According to the company’s own statement, its innovation is integrated with the emergence of a 
new  computing  model.  This  new  model,  replacing  the  PC-based,  client/server  approach,  is 
networked,  modular  and  open,  no  longer  confined  to  IT  systems  alone,  with  the  digital  
infrastructure of the world merging with the physical infrastructure of the world. 
Diversity of the companies subject to the present study is partly demonstrable on the grounds of  
observation of their pre – patenting innovative activity, measured with the ratio of non – capitalized 
R&D expenses to revenues ( Table 5). Accounting for this variable, the most important observation 
is the difference between Chevron, spending hardly more than 0,2% of its revenues and the other 
five, with spending comprised usually in an interval between 3 and 7% of their revenues. Then one 
can notice that Akzo – Nobel and IBM seem to spend more on R&D than the three automotive 
companies, whilst among the latter ones Honda seems to spend more than Ford and GM. 
 Table 5 – Non – capitalized R&D expenses as a percentage of revenues for Ford Motor, General  
Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM, during the period 2001 - 2008.  
Ford GM Honda Chevron Akzo Nobel IBM
Y2001 4,5% 3,6% 5,5% 0,2% 6,0% 6,0%
Y2002 4,7% 3,4% 5,4% 0,2% 6,5% 5,9%
Y2003 4,6% 3,3% 5,5% 0,2% 6,8% 5,7%
Y2004 4,3% 3,3% 5,5% 0,2% 6,4% 5,9%
Y2005 4,5% 3,4% 5,4% 0,2% 6,4% 6,4%
Y2006 4,5% 3,2% 5,2% 0,2% 6,4% 6,7%
Y2007 4,3% 4,5% 5,0% 0,3% 2,4% 6,2%
Y2008 5,0% 5,4% 4,9% 0,3% 2,3% 6,1%
Average 4,6% 3,8% 5,3% 0,2% 5,4% 6,1%
SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORTS.
The R&D effort seems to be both firm and industry specific. As for patent applications, which are 
supposed to be at least a part of the outcome of the R&D expenditures, the situation is slightly more 
complicated ( Table 6).  The biggest patenting activity had been taking place at Honda, with 5470 
patent applications filled during the period of 2001 – 2008. In a general manner, in the automotive 
sector is very active in patenting: during the period of study the three automotive firms filled 7467 
patent  applications  in  total  whilst  for  the  other  three  companies  the  same  total  was  of  1472. 
Surprisingly enough, Chevron, the “meanest” of the six as for R&D expenditures, filled more patent 
applications ( 686) than Akzo Nobel ( 236), IBM ( 550 ) or even General Motors (487).  Disparities 
in  the  size  of  patenting  activity,  remaining  quite  unexplained  by  the  differences  in  R&D 
expenditures, are not the only phenomenon worth noticing. Four of the six firms subject to analysis, 
IBM and Ford making an exception in this respect, seem to display a relatively even R&D spending 
in time and a sort of cycle of patenting, lasting some seven years, with a peak in 2006 and 2007.   
Once again, Chevron seems to be a separate case, with an exceptionally strong cyclical variation.
 
Table 6 – Number of patent applications filled at the US patent & Trademark office by Ford Motor,  
General Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM, during the period 2001 – 2008. All six  
companies are strongly focused on the US market and US Patent & Trademark Office is considered  
as one of the three “reference” patent offices, with the Japanese and the EU patent offices going  
along.   
GM Honda Chevron Akzo Nobel IBM
Y2001 41 350                7                 9               120    
Y2002 53 483              10               11                 54    
Y2003 63 563              73               19                 62    
Y2004 85 788              91               57                 63    
Y2005 68 942            135               56                 86    
Y2006 86 853            140               55                 48    
Y2007 64 855            152               25                 85    
Y2008 27 636              78                 4                 32    
Source: US Patent & Trademark Office
A strong firm – specificity is to notice as for the transformation of R&D outlays into patentable  
innovation. This transformation, possible to measure through a ratio of R&D expenditures per 1 
patent application filled, is shown in the Table 7. Important cross sectional and temporal differences 
are to notice. Honda is the cheapest inventor with an average of 6,42 USD mln of R&D outlays per  
1 patent application filled, with Chevron immediately following at an average rate of 9,73 USD mln 
per 1 patent application, other firms as distant followers and General Motors closing the comparison 
with 129,38 USD mln per 1 patent application on average. In a general manner, productivity of 
R&D outlays in term of patentable innovation is more differentiated among the three automotive 
companies – Ford, GM and Honda – than among the whole sample of six firms. This could indicate, 
though not in a conclusive way yet, that the productivity of R&D outlays is strongly connected to a 
more  broadly  understood  comparative  advantage,  thus  to  the  relative  performance  of  business 
strategies.  
Table 7- R&D outlays per 1 patent application filled at the US patent & Trademark office by Ford  
Motor, General Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM, during the period 2001 – 2008. 
Ford [ USD 
mln]
GM [ USD 
mln]
Honda [USD 
mln]
Chevron [USD 
mln]
Akzo Nobel [EUR 
mln]
IBM [USD mln]
Y2001 228,13 148,78 8,22 29,86 94,11 41,55
Y2002 28,84 113,21 6,55 22,10 82,91 87,96
Y2003 41,90 98,41 6,87 3,12 46,68 81,89
Y2004 41,57 76,47 5,43 2,66 14,32 90,05
Y2005 43,48 98,53 4,50 2,34 14,89 67,93
Y2006 29,39 76,74 5,05 3,34 16,09 127,23
Y2007 23,89 126,56 5,59 3,70 14,36 72,39
Y2008 65,77 296,30 9,13 10,71 88,25 198,03
Source: author’s
Innovative effort is supposed to end up in investment in specific assets, which, in turn, should lead 
to: a) some kind of temporary competitive advantage giving a result at the level of sales b) a change 
in  profitability or  the keep – up of  profitability at  a  certain level  c)  a  certain ability to attract 
investors and debt holders.  As for investment, net of depreciation, every firm is a specific case, 
without any obvious industry – specific differences ( Table 8 ).  The three automotive firms – Ford, 
GM and Honda – displayed an average net annual investment of 359, -4 607 and 1 375 USD mln 
respectively. The vertical firm – Chevron – comes as the champion of net investment with an annual 
average of 3 104 USD mln. AkzoNobel, the closest to Chevron in terms of industry, displays an 
average of – 10 USD mln annually. IBM, the only IT firm among the cases studied, exceeds 400 
USD mln of average annual net investment. In terms of net investment rate ( net investment divided 
by revenues ) Honda and Chevron are the champions of the small sample, with 1,7% and 1,4% 
respectively. Then come IBM ( 0,5%) and Ford ( 0,2%), General Motors and AkzoNobel displaying 
no net investment at all. 
Table 8 – investment in property, plant and equipment, net of depreciation, for Ford, GM, Honda,  
Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM. Time span: 2001 – 2008.
Ford [ USD mln] GM [ USD mln] Honda [USD mln] Chevron [USD 
mln]
Akzo Nobel [EUR 
mln]
IBM [USD mln]
Y2001 1 300,0 -    3 932,0 940,1 -        614,0 148,0 1 025,0
Y2002 1 900,0 -    4 994,0 868,6 1 031,0 8,0 884,0
Y2003 1 900,0 -    6 422,0 851,0 -        373,0 -         71,0 -         26,0
Y2004 -        100,0 -    6 449,0 708,2 863,0 -         14,0 -       214,0
Y2005 -     1 000,0 -    7 618,0 1 344,7 2 241,0 -         55,0 -       620,0
Y2006 1 553,0 -    2 983,0 1 652,2 5 294,0 -         23,0 829,0
Y2007 -        267,0 -    1 971,0 2 299,8 7 419,0 4,0 930,0
Y2008 -     2 413,0 -    2 484,0 2 337,2 8 967,0 -         78,0 397,0
Source: Annual reports
The proportions between the R&D effort, the outcome of this effort in terms of the number of patent 
application and net investment seem to be very firm specific. This specificity is further to notice as  
it comes to analyze the growth of revenues since 2001 till 2008. The assumption behind this study is 
that patentable innovation coming in significant quantity is likely, under the condition of a sound 
strategy, to bring a growth of revenues. Table 9 shows net annual revenues of the six firms in focus, 
since 2001 till 2008. In terms of size, Chevron is the biggest of the six, with GM, Ford, Honda, IBM 
and Akzo Nobel following respectively. During the period of analysis the champion of growth was 
Chevron, with 153,8% higher revenue in 2008 than in 2001( As far as Chevron is concerned one has 
to be aware of the merger with Texaco in 2004, which had obviously boosted its overall scale of 
activity, not only in terms of sales but also in terms of assets. However, being consistent with the 
theoretical background, especially with Schumpeter’s, Tobin’s and Phelps’s theories, it is assumed 
that growth through mergers and acquisitions is the same kind of supposed – to – be outcome of  
innovation as organic growth could have been.), followed closely by Honda ( + 125%), IBM and 
AkzoNobel lagging significantly behind with + 24,8% and +9,2% respectively. For General Motors 
and Ford the period of study brought a downshifting of scale of activity, by – 11,9% and -8,9% 
respectively.
Table 9 – net revenues of Ford, GM, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM. Time span: 2001 – 
2008.
Ford [ USD mln] GM [ USD mln] Honda [USD mln] Chevron [USD 
mln]
Akzo Nobel [EUR 
mln]
IBM [USD mln]
Y2001 160 652,0 169 051,0 52 682,1 104 409,0 14 110,0 83 067,0
Y2002 162 256,0 177 867,0 58 949,0 98 961,0 14 002,0 81 186,0
Y2003 164 331,0 185 837,0 70 581,7 119 575,0 13 051,0 89 131,0
Y2004 172 255,0 195 351,0 77 809,4 150 865,0 12 833,0 96 293,0
Y2005 176 835,0 194 655,0 78 473,2 193 641,0 13 000,0 91 134,0
Y2006 160 065,0 204 467,0 83 682,4 204 892,0 13 737,0 91 424,0
Y2007 172 455,0 179 984,0 96 104,9 214 091,0 15 255,0 98 786,0
Y2008 146 277,0 148 979,0 118 546,5 264 958,0 15 415,0 103 630,0
Source: Annual reports
Profitability, short – term and long - term capital accumulation come as the next possible results of 
innovation, according to the Equation 2 of the model. As for profitability, its net ratio is shown in 
Table 10, which introduces IBM as the most profitable, with an average net profit ratio of 9,1% over 
the years 2001 – 2008.  Then come Chevron, Akzo Nobel, Honda, Ford and GM, with respective 
averages of 6,6%, 6,1%, 5,2%, - 2,6% and – 5,8%.    
 
Table 10 – net profit ratio of Ford, GM, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM. Time span: 2001 –  
2008.
Ford GM Honda Chevron Akzo Nobel IBM
Y2001 -3,4% 0,2% 3,6% 3,1% 4,8% 9,3%
Y2002 -0,6% 1,0% 4,9% 1,1% 5,8% 4,4%
Y2003 0,3% 2,1% 5,4% 6,0% 4,6% 8,5%
Y2004 1,8% 1,4% 5,7% 8,8% 7,4% 8,8%
Y2005 0,8% -5,4% 5,6% 7,3% 7,4% 8,7%
Y2006 -7,9% -1,2% 6,0% 8,4% 8,4% 10,4%
Y2007 -1,6% -24,1% 5,4% 8,7% 5,6% 10,5%
Y2008 -10,0% -20,7% 5,0% 9,0% 4,8% 11,9%
Source: Annual reports
The  Table  11 shows  annual  absolute  change  of  the  book  value  of  assets,  which  means  the 
arithmetical difference between the book value of assets at the end of the year n1 minus the book 
value of assets at the end of the year n0, for the six companies studied, It is an approximation of  
short – term capital accumulation processes. Chevron and Honda accumulate, on the short – run, 
much more than the other four. Ford, GM and IBM display negative average annual accumulation.  
If the theoretical, Schumpeterian assumption that scientific input generates accumulation of capital, 
it is worth to study the average change of the book value of assets per patent application, for each 
firm. From this point of view Chevron is the absolute leader with a long – term average of 163,88  
million of USD per patent application. Then a long gap is to notice, after which Ford, Honda and 
IBM follow,  with  14,67 million,  12,47 million  and 12,46 million  respectively,  General  Motors 
displaying a negative ratio of – 2,44. As for long – term ability to accumulate capital, Tobin’s q ratio 
had been computed, at the year’s end, for each firm and each of the years studied ( Table 12 ). On 
average IBM ( average q = 2,2 ) and Honda ( average q = 2,06) are the leaders,  with the other four 
keeping an average above q = 1,00. 
Table 11 – Annual absolute change of the book value of assets of Ford, GM, Honda, Chevron, Akzo 
Nobel and IBM. Time span: 2001 – 2008. 
Ford [ USD 
mln]
GM [ USD mln] Honda [USD 
mln]
Chevron [USD 
mln]
Akzo Nobel 
[EUR mln]
IBM [USD mln]
Y2002 10 119,00 101,00 942,06 -      213,00 -   136,00 13 735,56
Y2003 21 392,00 1 648,00 9 382,01 4 111,00 -   835,00 6 944,23
Y2004 -  3 670,00 689,00 12 439,10 11 738,00 -       3,00 4 650,98
Y2005 -23 750,00 1 595,00 11 381,29 32 625,00 474,00 -  2 516,34
Y2006 14 922,00 -4 912,00 5 129,57 6 795,00 360,00 -  4 504,25
Y2007 -  5 131,00 -1 372,00 5 269,23 16 158,00 6 458,00 9 711,25
Y2008 -62 750,00 501,00 14 541,84 12 379,00 -   509,00 -28 971,72
Source: Annual reports
 
Table 12 –tobin’s q at the year’s end for Ford, GM, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM. Time 
span: 2001 – 2008.
Ford GM Honda Chevron Akzo Nobel IBM
Y2001 1,13 0,97 2,19 1,80 1,91 3,05
Y2002 1,06 1,04 1,80 1,50 1,51 2,15
Y2003 1,03 1,00 1,85 1,69 1,52 2,24
Y2004 1,03 0,99 1,84 1,69 1,53 2,21
Y2005 1,03 1,00 1,87 1,50 1,65 1,91
Y2006 1,04 1,13 2,17 1,67 1,72 2,14
Y2007 1,04 1,38 2,88 1,78 1,17 2,01
Y2008 1,13 1,98 1,85 1,38 0,94 1,91
Source: Annual reports
There are different paths of translation from scientific input to real technological change. One of the 
two champions of investment – Honda – represents the pattern of high R&D effort combined with a 
high number of patentable inventions and important embodiment of this  scientific input in new 
technologies. The second of the two – Chevron – translates a relatively small R&D effort into a 
moderate scientific result in terms of patent applications and all that is transformed into big net 
investment in specific assets as well as into important accumulation of capital. Honda and Chevron 
present four common traits. Firstly, they both tend to come at the stage of patentable invention at a  
fairly low cost in terms of non – capitalized R&D outlays. Secondly, they both seem to be able to 
boost their scale of activity on the grounds of their innovative effort. Thirdly, they both operate at a 
satisfactory, though not astounding, level of net profitability, around 5 – 6%. Finally, both display a 
relatively high value of average Tobin’s q, thus a good ability to accumulate capital on the long run. 
The difference between them is the size, both absolute and relative to revenues, of their R&D effort,  
as well as the absolute size of their scientific input to production, in terms of patent applications. 
General Motors and IBM are to find the other extremity of the scale as far as the average cost of one 
patent application, in terms of non – capitalized R&D outlays, is considered. That average cost for 
both of them is around 100 millions of USD, 129,38 for GM and 95,88 for IBM. Also, maybe 
incidentally,  they  both  present  a  similar  level  of  average  scientific  input  in  terms  of  patent 
applications: 60,875 annually on average for General Motors and 68,75 for IBM. From the point of 
view of market environment, both firms seem to conduct their innovative effort under a strong 
external pressure upon technological race. On the other hand, they tend to diverge under every other 
aspect  considered.  Outstanding net  profitability of  IBM as  well  as  its  quite  good dynamics  of 
revenues clearly contrast with the net losses and decreasing scale of activity of General Motors. 
Both short and long term accumulation of capital seems to be an advantage of IBM and a real  
problem for GM. 
The  average  cost  of  one  patent  application,  in  terms  of  non  –  capitalized  R&D  outlays,  still 
considered, the two cases in the middle of the scale, Ford and Akzo Nobel, are to analyze, with that 
cost approaching 63 millions of USD and 46 millions of USD, respectively.  They both present 
considerable uncertainty as for accumulation of assets and for net investment, with Ford managing 
this uncertainty with noticeably better results. Also, they both spend a similar percentage of their  
revenues, about 5%, on R&D. Besides, they are rather divergent in other respects. Akzo Nobel 
seems to be sustainably profitable, Ford does not. On the other hand, the scientific input in terms of 
patent applications per year is almost ten times higher at Ford than at Akzo Nobel.  The long term 
ability to accumulate capital seems to be significantly better for Akzo Nobel.
The productivity of R&D activity, in terms of the average amount of R&D expenses needed to bring 
up one patentable invention, seems to be the key variable shaping the rationale of firms’ strategies. 
Honda and Chevron are efficient transformers of innovative effort operating in different business 
environments. Honda is under a strong external pressure to innovate, whilst Chevron can afford 
more endogenously driven innovation. On the other hand, both firms tend to consider the early 
stages of innovative activity as highly autonomous from the production business and they both 
manage innovation so as to conduct those early stages of innovation in separate organizations, with 
eventual arrangement of practical applications. Conclusion: regardless the magnitude and the main 
driving force of innovative effort in a firm, there seems to be a strong and positive interdependence 
between the efficiency of R&D effort in conducting innovative projects up the stage of practical 
patenting, and, on the other hand, the efficiency of the firm in accumulating capital, investing in 
specific assets and boosting sales. Firms that display that kind of business pattern, are sustainable 
both in their current operational activity and in their long – run interactions with capital markets. 
The other four cases indicate that if the R&D activity of a firm seems inefficient in terms of R&D 
outlays per one patent application, it could mean two things. Firstly, the apparent inefficiency of 
innovative activity may mean real efficiency problems of the whole business, as in the case of 
General  Motors.  Secondly,  the  inefficiency of  R&D could  be  just  a  mistaking appearance,  for 
example due to the fact that technological race goes on so fast that there is not enough time for 
patenting every valuable outcome of R&D activity. 
 The  core  question  of  the  case  studies  was:  why do most  of  the  worlds  innovative  effort  and 
scientific input takes place in markets which are apparently hostile to innovation, as judged by 
marginal GDP per patent application ? The simplest possible answer is that firms do innovation 
either because they have to or because this is their comparative advantage and they can do it in an 
exceptionally efficient way. The two are linked, by the way. A comparative advantage in the field of  
R&D is likely to appear when an external pressure is felt. Exogenous pressure on innovation is 
strongly rooted in local product markets and their institutions, and thus long – lasting, just as the 
comparative  advantage  in  R&D.  Economies  develop  as  firms  develop.  Economic  growth  is 
grounded in efficient business patterns. In some countries those business patterns shape themselves 
in an environment which hems them in with a lot of stimuli to develop innovative activity. This  
leads to the development of an economy which, regardless its pace of economic growth and balance 
of payments, comes to a point when marginal value added on innovation is negative. At this point, 
however, incentives to innovate do not disappear and firms continue to apply the same business 
patterns and thus do create scientific input which gives back negative marginal real output. 
 
5         Conclusions
 
In the light of what precedes the big question is: is the present pattern of technological progress, 
both in its macroeconomic and microeconomic plan, likely to last and how long ? What could it be 
replaced with ? Both the model and the case studies seem to indicate that the pattern is pretty 
durable. The main condition to its stability seems to be the development of financial markets, as 
well as their stability to recover after crises. As long as financial placements assure decent payoffs, 
accumulation of capital is likely to keep on going, particularly in firms with highly efficient R&D 
activity even if at the aggregate level marginal value added on innovation is negative. This seem to 
confirm the Frank Knight’s opinion, that the development of corporations had created a unique kind 
of link between the accumulation of capital and the practical, operational conduct of the business, 
with all the related risks and uncertainties (Knight 1921). On the long run, since the beginnings of 
the corporation, financial markets demonstrate a peculiar ability to survive crises and to get reborn 
even after decades of relative downshifting ( Harris 2005; Chaudhuri 1965; Hansmann, Kraakman, 
Squire 2006; Michie 2000). Thus, the keystone of the present global pattern of technological 
progress seems to remain durable on the long run, which does not exclude, of course, short term 
disturbances. Also, it is hard to imagine what could replace the present pattern. Would innovation 
systematically take place in markets in which there is not external pressure on innovation or in 
economies in which successful financial placements cannot give an opportunity to compensate the 
downturns of innovative projects ?   
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